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frame analysis of Iraqi news bulletins, this study reveals that Iraqi media outlets provide indeed 
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military successes against IS and jointly refrain from any criticism against the varied forces fighting 
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Introduction 
 
The ethno-sectarian divisions in Iraq today pose an existential threat on the belea-
guered state. The potential secession of Kurdistan, the establishment of the so-
called Islamic State (IS) and the Sunni-Shiite divide has left the nation teetering on 
the brink. The media development in Iraq naturally reflects these cleavages. Gen-
erally, one can argue that the Iraqi media system is characterized by external plu-
ralism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: p. 27), where diversity is expressed at the level of 
the system, rather than within each outlet. As in other fragile states struggling with 
societal fragmentation and a high potential for armed conflict, partiality of media 
has become the very nature and defining feature of the media landscape in Iraq. 
Media are widely used as mouthpieces by conflict parties and political interest 
groups and are hence suspected of inciting sectarian hatred and exacerbating divi-
sions (al-Marashi 2007; Price, al-Marashi & Stremlau 2010; Awad & Eaton 2013; 
Isakhan 2009). 
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The study at hand1 analyzes the nature of discourse on domestic conflicts in Iraqi 
TV channels with an emphasis on actors and frames. The aim was to understand if 
Iraqi media channels offer a variety of views on contested issues and how they dif-
fer in the coverage of these issues. Furthermore, we also wanted to probe which 
groups were excluded in the mainstream media and if propagandistic and inciteful 
speech is part of the public discourse in Iraq. Probing these questions allowed us to 
draw conclusions about the current character of Iraqi pluralism.  
The study reveals that, to a certain extent, Iraqi TV channels provide contesting 
frames on even the most divisive of issues. Furthermore, and despite the security, 
political and financial challenges, which have helped strengthen the links between 
political actors and the media, the study shows that on the armed battle with IS, 
the media have rallied around the flag and broadcast unifying messages so much 
so that human rights violations committed by members of the joint forces against 
Sunni civilians are overlooked by the Iraqi media. Indeed, the absence of criticism 
and pluralism on this front reflects the increased influence of the non-state militias 
in Iraq as well as a possible lack of control regarding their armed activities. 
 
 
Recent developments in the Iraqi media sector 
 
With the fall of the Baath regime in April 2003, the Iraqi media sector experienced 
a sudden liberation that brought along the emergence of hundreds of media chan-
nels. Between the years 2003 and 2004, more than 150 non-state-owned newspa-
pers, 80 radio stations and 21 television stations were available to the Iraqi au-
dience (Deane 2013: 18).2 The Iraqi media landscape acquired a truly pluralistic 
character, representing all major political forces as well as minorities and regional 
groups from all parts of the country (Cochrane 2006; Sins 2011; al-Marashi 2007; 
al-Rawi 2012; Isakhan 2009: 10; Wollenberg 2015). In addition to the newly emer-
ging local media, Iraqi citizens also gained access to more than 300 Arab satellite 
TV channels, previously banned under the Baath regime.  
Other developments included the abolishment of the Iraqi Ministry of Information 
and the dismissal of 7000 employees, and the return of Iraqi dissidents and expa-
triates who brought with them experience and media knowledge gained from living 
and working abroad. The renewal of media ethics and a vivid discourse on the role 
of media in the development of democracies soon became part of the transforma-
tion (Isakhan 2009: 10; Awad & Eaton 2013; Kim & Hama-Saeed 2008). 
 
Today, most Iraqi media outlets have strong ties to political stakeholders. For ins-
tance, al-Ahed TV is funded by Asayib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)3, Baghdad TV is affiliated 
to the pro-Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and al-Furat to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic 
                                                 
1 The study was conducted within the framework of a longterm media assistance program of MiCT 
in Iraq (mict-international.org) with financial support of the German Foreign Office. 
2 Figures on newly founded media outlets after 2003 vary widely depending on the source. For 
more information on the wave of startups see Brookings Institution (2008) and Sins (2011).  
3 Asayib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) is a Shi’a paramilitary group called “League of the Righteous”. They are 
part of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU; arab: al-Hashd al-Shaabi). 
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Council (SIIC). Other private channels belong to businessmen closely affiliated to 
parties and sects, such as al-Sharqiya TV, which is owned by secular nationalist 
Saad al-Bazzaz and considered a moderate pro-Sunni channel (Cochrane 2006; 
Price, al-Marashi & Stremlau 2010: 232-324; al-Rawi 2012: 63f.; Isakhan 2009: 
10-11; Awad & Eaton 2013; Ghazi 2006; Deane 2013: 18). Funding for media is 
provided from within Iraq as well as from without by foreign forces, mainly Saudi 
Arabia, the USA and (on a secondary level) Iran (Isakhan 2009; al-Rawi 
2012:105). Isakhan (2009) highlights the harmful impact foreign intervention has 
had on the development of domestic media, and by extension, on the democratic 
quality of the public sphere. The US government, in particular, has been widely 
criticized by many commentators for their repression of dissident voices in the ear-
ly stages of the occupation and their relentless effort to “manufacture consent” 
(Isakhan 2009) by manipulating media coverage (Cochrane 2006; Isakhan 2009; 
Awad & Eaton 2013; al-Rawi 2012; Katulis 2014). Meanwhile, independent media 
with no ethno-sectarian affiliation have struggled for survival in a media market 
controlled by political forces and with limited advertising revenue (Wollenberg 
2015: 159).  
In order to compensate for the partiality and other shortcomings of the private sec-
tor, the Public Service Broadcaster the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) was founded by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2004.4 According to CPA order 66, 
the IMN, with its flagship channel al-Iraqiya, was intended to reflect and foster 
the varied values of the Iraqi nation and to work as an integrative force in the soci-
ety. However, soon after it was founded, the IMN fell under the tight grip of the 
government and placed the political interest of the government before that of the 
public (Awad & Eaton 2013; al-Rawi 2012: 72-74; Isakhan 2009; Ghazi 2006; 
Amos 2010). By comparing election coverage of state-run channel al-Iraqiya with 
coverage on the privately owned channel al-Sharqiya in the run up to the provin-
cial elections 2010, Deborah Amos (2010) demonstrated that Iraqi TV stations are 
actually operating as mouthpieces for the different political camps in Iraq (see also 
al-Rawi & Gunter 2013).  
On a visit to the al-Iraqiya studio, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said: “Ira-
qiya satellite channel is in fact the channel of the Iraqi government, which carries 
some commitment [...] it should support the Iraqi state with its problems, chal-
lenges and achievements [...] it should never be, necessarily, against the policy of 
the state [...]” (al-Rawi 2012: 98). Consequently, al-Iraqiya is perceived by the 
Iraqi media users as just another party channel representing the interests of the 
government and its ruling Da’wa party.  
 
In light of the fragmented media landscape, many international observers have 
voiced their concern about the role the Iraqi media has played in exacerbating con-
flict (al-Marashi 2007; al-Rawi 2012; Cochrane 2006; Price, al-Marashi & Strem-
lau 2010: 237; Deane 2013: 19; Awad & Eaton 2013: 13). James Deane (2013: 6) 
argues that “as the media fragments in fractured states, many current media and 
                                                 
4 The CPA was the US-led transitional government in Iraq that was established right after the fall of 
the Baath-regime in March 2003. 
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communication trends are reinforcing and intensifying separate identities rather 
than encouraging the development of shared identity”. In this view, ethno-
sectarian rifts represented in the media further escalate ethno-sectarian conflict in 
Iraq. Meanwhile, al-Marashi’s (2007) influential analysis of language and partiali-
ty among Iraqi TV channels concluded that ethno-sectarian communities were not 
directly demonized in the media but TV channels tended to portray their commu-
nities as victims in Iraq’s ongoing violence (ibid.: 88; see also Deane 2013: 19). The 
question of mobilization and incitement will also be analyzed in this study.  
Understanding the role of media in conflict and democratic progress therefore re-
quires the consideration of media use and media literacy in Iraq. Although re-
search on these issues is scarce, there is reason to believe that, based on the au-
thoritarian rule of the past, Iraqi media users maintain a healthy distrust of the lo-
cal media and their messages. Generally, Iraqis seem to be critical towards media 
and they have developed a reasonable level of media literacy in order to navigate 
the complicated and diverse Iraqi media landscape (Isakhan 2009: 20-21, Amos 
2010: 7-9).  
 
Although limited in resources and power, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), and subsequently the Iraqi government, tried to silence oppositional voices 
since the beginning of the transformation in 2003. In June 2003, the CPA released 
Order Number 14 on “Prohibited Media Activities” that rendered illegal a variety of 
communication activities, including “incitement of violence against Coalition Forc-
es and CPA personnel” as well as “advocating civil disorder” (Isakhan 2009: 14; al-
Rawi 2012: 82). Shortly thereafter the CPA closed down Mosul TV for rebroadcast-
ing media content from al-Jazeera, and in April 2004 the newspaper al-Hawza 
representing the Sadr movement was shut down as well – both interventions effec-
tively fueling the popularity of the Sadr movement on one side and the Sunni re-
sistance on the other (Isakhan 2009: 15-16). In November 2006, TV channels 
Zawra and Salahiddin were also shut down for covering public demonstrations 
protesting the verdict convicting Saddam Hussein of crimes against humanity 
(Kim & Hama-Saeed 2008: 588; Isakhan 2009: 14; al-Rawi 2012: 83-85).  
 
Over the years, the relationship between opposition media outlets and the gov-
ernment would only grow more hostile. In February 2011, when ten thousand Ira-
qis took to the streets in Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Ramadi, and Diwaniya to protest 
against corruption and poor basic services, journalists were attacked and arrested 
by security forces for covering the protests.5 In June 2012, the regulatory body 
CMC6 published a list of 47 media outlets allegedly lacking official permits, some of 
which were later suspended (Reporters without Borders 2012). One year later, in 
                                                 
5 See report of Human Rights Watch on the February 2011 protests in Erbil, Sulimaniya and 
Baghdad,  
https://rsf.org/en/news/threat-close-47-radio-and-tv-stations-protests-against-repressive-law. 
6 The CMC was founded based on CPA order Number 65 as an an independent entity for media 
regulation to strengthen pluralism and diversity in the Iraqi media landscape. Yet, soon after its 
foundation, just like the Iraqi Media Network, the CMC was shifted under the control of the 
government (Isakhan 2009).  
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April 2013, another ten channels were confronted with a notification of closure by 
the CMC, this time referring to their alleged incitement of violence related to the 
turmoil in Hawija (Reporters without Borders 2013).7 
 
Despite the many efforts to align public opinion in favor of the government, the 
persistence of critical voices in the Iraqi public sphere indicates that pluralism in 
Iraq is indeed resilient (Wollenberg 2015: 160-161). It should be noted, however, 
that the most powerful restrictions on press freedom are not imposed by the gov-
ernment but by non-state actors (Kim & Hama-Saeed 2008: 586; al-Rawi 2012: 
66). Indeed, armed militias and extremist elements regularly target journalists and 
media outlets who, as a result, are reluctant to tackle delicate issues relating to 
these groups (Kim & Hama Saeed 2008: 583; Wollenberg 2015; al-Rawi 2012: 
101). The death of more than 200 journalists between June 2004 and February 
2017, 62% of whom were deliberately killed for political reasons, is a case in point.8 
It is for this reason that Iraq is considered one of the most dangerous places in the 
world for journalists.  
 
The rise of IS in Iraq also impacted the working environment of journalists and 
media workers. According to Iraqi journalists, one of the biggest challenges they 
have had to cope with was the critical and professional coverage of events relating 
to the fight against IS.9 Journalists have stated that they are expected to support 
the state and non-state troops in their fight and to turn a blind eye on human 
rights violations committed by these groups. Indeed, the CMC had informed media 
outlets that reports should focus on the success of the Iraqi army and the support-
ing Shi’a militias. Not to do so would be unpatriotic.10 Another challenge for Iraqi 
journalists is IS’ professional communication approach. Besides the official media 
office al-Furqan, the communication machinery of IS in Iraq comprises a con-
glomerate of central and regional production units in charge of producing and dis-
tributing audio-visual media content. Meanwhile, IS is operating more than 300 
social media channels.11 Due to their rather late entry into the realm of social me-
dia, domestic media players are effectively disadvantaged and far behind in prom-
ulgating their views on social media.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Already in the previous years, the CMC has regularly reprimanded TV-channels with Sunni 
leanings such as al-Babeliya, Baghdad TV, al-Rafidayn, al-Sharkiya, al-Baghdadiya (al-Rawi 
2012: 89). 
8 See the online database of the Committee to Protect Journalists 
https://cpj.org/killed/mideast/iraq/. 
9 This problem was discussed among Iraqi journalists in a training session held in May 2015, that 
Anja Wollenberg and Maral Jekta attended as staff members of MiCT (Media in Cooperation and 
Transition). 
10 Ibid. 
11 The production infrastructure of IS in Iraq comprises the video production unit al-Itissam, the 
music production unit al-Ajnad Foundation, the media center al-Hayat as well as a plethora of 
regional media offices responsible for the production and distribution of strictly localized media 
content. 
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Theoretical framework: variations on media pluralism and its impact 
on conflict  
 
In the field of communications, pluralism is widely conceptualized as an indicator 
of the openness of the public sphere and democratic participation. Likewise, a di-
versity of opinions circulating in the public and a broad and ever-changing spec-
trum of topics discussed are both manifestations of media pluralism (Neidhardt & 
Gerhards 1990). Moreover, comprehensive representation, where every communi-
ty and every strand of the society can see itself as being part of that society, is piv-
otal for the cohesion of that society and for the communication between the gov-
ernment and its people since only those concerns represented in the public can 
make their way on to the political agenda (Habermas 1998; Neidhardt & Gerhards 
1990; Imhof 2008). Pluralism has also been perceived as a means to prevent any 
particular ideology or belief from dominating the public sphere and is thus a cor-
nerstone against paternalism and universalism. As such, in media policy-making 
as well as in academic discourse the concept of pluralism has gradually gained im-
portance in recent history (Karppinen 2007).  
Habermas acknowledges pluralism of opinions as a starting point for a deliberative 
process that ideally leads to consensus on the basis of rational exchange among 
equally free citizens (Habermas 1998; Sunstein 2002). Mouffe (2007), meanwhile, 
conceptualizes pluralism as the continuous co-existence of incompatible view-
points in society and in public debate. Here, healthy democracy is based on contes-
tation, conflict and dissonance (Karppinen 2007). This difference between a con-
sensus-oriented approach and an antagonistic approach is of particular im-
portance in the analysis of young beleaguered democracies that inevitably struggle 
with the challenges of transformation.  
 
In Iraq, as demonstrated in the previous section, pluralism flourished to a certain 
extent after the 2003 occupation and it was praised as one of the few democratic 
achievements in the post-Baath era. But within the context of fragile statehood, the 
public discourse has over time become increasingly polarized. From a comparative 
viewpoint the media structure in Iraq quickly gained some of the features of what 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) conceptualized as the Polarized Pluralist model, such 
as a low level of professionalism among journalists and media producers, strong 
affiliations between political parties and media outlets and strongly biased cover-
age of political conflict. However, due to important contextual factors such as con-
flict, state size and state role, one can conclude that just as Lebanon, Iraq can be 
seen as a variation of the Polarized Pluralist model that is shaped by violent con-
flict and fragile statehood (El-Richani 2016).12  
Iraq is not an exception in this regard and there is reason to belief that democratic 
pluralism increases the likelihood of conflict in the context of fragile states and 
transformation. Deane (2013) observed that the pluralistic media landscapes in 
fragile states such as Iraq and Somalia are often fragmented along the same fault 
                                                 
12 Cochrane, amongst other commentators, has long spoken of the Lebanonization of Iraqi politics 
and media (Cochrane 2006).  
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lines that divide society. Extended access to information and deregulation go hand 
in hand with co-option of media by political parties: “In short: fractured media 
markets are also co-opted media environments” (Deane, 2013: 8). Deane also re-
fers to an “echo chamber” pattern in the interaction between conflict-riven socie-
ties and the fragmented media sphere that ultimately increases group polarization 
in the society (Deane, 2013: 9). This observation strongly resonates with the selec-
tive exposure paradigm, where media users consume news sources that cater to 
their already existing convictions. Consequently, if people in the long term avoid 
viewpoint-challenging information, their society will become more fragmented 
while commonalities between insulated opinion-communities will dwindle (Sun-
stein 2002: 4; Garrett 2006: 1).  
 
The question, however, remains: where does one draw the line between a plural-
istic media system and a dysfunctional polarized one that jeopardizes the cohesion 
of society and threatens stability? By analyzing recent media developments in 
Egypt, Hafez concludes that pluralistic polarization in the public sphere acquires 
anti-democratic qualities once the political camps start denying each other’s legit-
imacy. Radical polarization began with the overthrow of long-term Egyptian presi-
dent Mubarak in 2011 and escalated during the short period of the Muslim Broth-
erhood’s Mohammad Morsi’s reign culminating in the concurrent collapse of dem-
ocratic pluralism in the political system and the public sphere. Consequently, 
Hafez (2014) privileges the idea of a national integrated public sphere for Egypt as 
it was conceptualized by Habermas (1998). Strengthening conflict and contestation 
– as demanded by Mouffe (2007) – might help revive democratic debate in West-
ern Europe, he notes. However, in the young unstable democracies in the Middle 
East and North Africa, where cohesion of society and the integrity of the nation is 
jeopardized by conflict, a nationally integrated public sphere and the search for 
common grounds might be more useful to support a peaceful process of transfor-
mation.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
This study is based on a qualitative frame analysis on Iraqi channels’ news cover-
age of domestic conflicts, focusing on what aspects of a certain event were high-
lighted, how the problem, the protagonists and aims were defined, how the situa-
tion was evaluated and what kind of solutions were suggested. This approach 
draws on Entman’s (1993: 52) definition of framing as the selection of “some as-
pects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, 
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.13 
                                                 
13 Quite often positions are articulated without referring to all of the mentioned aspects of a frame. 
In fact, often explanations for cause and effect are missing and/or reference to a specific solution. 
Therefore, frame analysis cannot be conducted as a systematic execution of a given procedure but 
rather as a discursive and interpretative approach.  
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Framing accentuates a certain angle that the author of a statement or text uses to 
emphasize specific aspects rather than others. Framing hence creates meaning and 
implies a certain reading of reality. In the journalistic workflow, frames are often 
selected and reproduced with no particular intention or even awareness. However, 
framing has proven to be a subtle but powerful way to enforce political messages in 
the public sphere (Entman 1993). The research methodology in the study at hand 
is based on the assumption that, by comparing the different frames that are circu-
lated in a public debate on a given topic, one can draw conclusions about the quali-
ty of pluralism and its impact on the political process. 
 
The analysis was conducted as a discursive process in which the three researchers 
regularly met to discuss and coordinate their observations and interpretations. 
This way, the validity of the findings was substantiated. In the discussions, the re-
searchers then aimed to identify dominant and peripheral frames and compare 
Iraqi TV channels in their balance of speakers, frames and messages.  
 
The database comprises 49 main evening news bulletins of 7 different local chan-
nels within the week of 16 - 22 August 2015. Each news bulletin comprised an av-
erage of 14 items, totaling to 699. The programs were recorded and topics and po-
sitions of all news items were logged. Three major events were identified and se-
lected for the analysis:  
 
 Government reform and civic protests  
 The release of an investigation report on the fall of Mosul 
 Armed encounters between IS and Iraqi military forces in al-Anbar and 
Salahuddin 
 
A total of 343 relevant news items were transcribed and translated into English. 
The Arabic recordings were at hand and consulted regularly during the analysis.  
In the selection of channels, reach and popularity were taken into consideration 
aiming for a sample of influential channels. More importantly though, the sample 
was designed to mirror the political diversity of the Iraqi media landscape. As po-
litical parallelism is a key feature of the Iraqi media, channels critical and support-
ive of the government supported by Sunni and Shi’a parties respectively were se-
lected. In addition, the researchers included Kurdish channels as well as the na-
tional broadcaster. Finally, a private commercial TV station was included. The fol-
lowing channels were part of the sample:  
 
Al-Iraqiya – main satellite channel of the Iraqi Media Network that was founded 
in 2003 as umbrella organization for Iraq’s public service broadcasters (TV and 
Radio).  
Al-Sharkiya – private channel owned by Saad al-Bazzaz a former crony of Sad-
dam Hussein. Al-Sharkiya is allegedly co-financed by Saudi Arabia (al-Rawi 2012; 
Isakhan 2009).  
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Al-Ahed – owned by Qais al-Khazali, leader of the Shi’a paramilitary group The 
League of the Righteous (Asayib Ahl al-Haq/AAH). The channel was founded in 
2014 to promote the legitimacy and power of the Popular Mobilization Units 
(PMU) in Iraq.  
Al-Taghyir – funded by the prominent Sunni millionaire Khamis al-Khanjar who 
is at the same time the founder and chairman of the Office of the Arab-Sunni Rep-
resentative for Iraq.  
Al-Sumeria – private channel with headquarters in Beirut. Al-Sumeria is the 
most commercial channel in the Iraqi media landscape with entertainment pro-
grams dominating the channel’s content (IREX 2012). 
Rudaw – funded and financed by Prime Minister of Kurdistan Nechirvan Barza-
ni, nephew of regional president Mahmoud Barzani in 2013.14 
NRT – was founded by Kurdish businessman Shaswar Wahid as an independent 
channel that would not be affiliated with any party.  
 
The selection of the week monitored (16 - 22 August 2015) for data collection was 
random and not related to any event or development.  
 
 
Findings: Internal Pluralism reigns despite partiality 
 
Frames in the news coverage were mainly introduced by speakers, directly or indi-
rectly quoted by the channel (rather than by journalists or anchors themselves). 
They thus emerged from a patchwork of statements quoted by a channel and con-
textualized by journalistic comment. In the news coverage pertaining to the three 
major events listed above, the following frames were identified: 
                                                 
14 The three channels al-Ahed, Rudaw and al-Taghyir were all founded only recently. Therefore no 
data on reach and popularity are available at this point in time. 
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Topics Frames Identified on... 
Political Reform 
 Critically supporting the reforms:
the steps taken by the government are 
generally endorsed, but speakers demand it 
to be more comprehensive, clear and to be 
carried out more quickly. 
Al-Iraqiya, al-Sumeria, al-
Sharkiya, al-Taghyir, al-
Ahed 
 Defending the reforms: 
the reform process is defended against 
allegations that it is directed at specific 
individuals with the purpose to settle 
political scores.  
Al-Iraqiya, al-Taghyir, al-
Sharkiya, al-Sumeria 
 Rejecting the reforms: 
the integrity and necessity of the reform 
process altogether is questioned. 
Al-Ahed, al-Sharkiya 
Mosul Report 
 Defending the committee:
the committee is defended against 
allegations that its work is directed at 
specific individuals with the aim to settle 
scores. 
Al-Iraqiya, al-Sharkiya, al-
Taghyir, al-Sumeria 
 Rejecting the report:
The legitimacy of the committee and the 
report is altogether questioned. 
Al-Taghyir, al-Sumeria, al-
Ahed, al-Sharkiya 
 Supporting the report:
The release of the report is strongly 
welcomed. 
NRT, Rudaw, al-Sumeria
The armed battle 
with IS 
 Success of the military forces: 
The military successes against the “IS 
terrorists” are in indiscriminately 
highlighted while any military progress by 
IS is mostly blanked out. 
Al-Iraqiya, al-Sumeria, al-
Sharkiya, al-Taghyir, al-
Ahed, NRT, Rudaw 
 The unity of the joint forces:
despite the ethno-sectarian differences 
between the various armed forces they are 
unified in the fight against the IS. 
Al-Iraqiya, al-Sumeria, al-
Sharkiya, al-Taghyir, al-
Ahed, NRT, Rudaw 
 Joint forces face difficulties: 
Joint forces struggle and lose soldiers in 
their fight against the IS. 
Al-Taghyir 
 
a. Political Reform 
 
During the week assessed, one of the most dominant themes was the package of 
reforms introduced by Prime Minister al-Abadi as a response to popular protests. 
The reforms included decreasing the size of the bloated government by merging 
ministries, scrapping all the deputy PM positions as well as hundreds of posts 
draining the coffers of the government. Other reforms included reducing the num-
ber of government official body guards by 90%, integrating special battalions with 
the Ministry of Interior and Defense to participate in the fight against IS and a re-
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vision of government officials’ high salaries and pensions. 
With the exception of the state-owned al-Iraqiya, the dominant frame on all 
channels is supportive of the reforms in principle but also skeptical of the scope 
and extent of the reform process. In this “critically supportive” frame the steps tak-
en by the government are generally endorsed, but speakers demand it to be more 
comprehensive and to be carried out more quickly and more efficiently in order to 
have the necessary impact. Critical supporters warn against slow and partial im-
plementation and they urge the government to include the judiciary and security 
apparatus in the reform. For instance, in al-Sumeria’s interview with al-Abadi’s 
spokesperson, the anchor often interrupts him, challenging him about former deci-
sions that were not implemented and the time frame for the implementation of re-
forms. This criticism is particularly articulated by the civil protesters in the street 
that perceive the judiciary as a corrupt body itself that is not equipped to facilitate 
the reform process. In that same vein, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani warns of Iraqi 
partition, if real reforms were not implemented. The “critically supportive” frame 
is favored by the two private channels al-Sumeria and al-Sharkiya and, to a lesser 
degree, in the news coverage of AAH-owned al-Ahed and Sunni-backed al-
Taghyir.  
 
A second frame, which is prevalent on state-owned al-Iraqiya, promotes and de-
fends al-Abadi’s reforms. Here, Prime Minister al-Abadi and his spokesman 
Hadithi deny that the reform process aims to settle scores. They emphasize that 
the reform is not directed at any specific group, party or individual and they harsh-
ly attack the corrupt and privileged for trying to obstruct the reform process and 
derailing public demands. Al-Abadi and Hadithi also ask the public for patience 
since the reform is designed as a gradual process that cannot be implemented in-
stantly. In his statements, al-Abadi emphasizes the cooperation with parliament 
and the council of ministers highlighting the very collective nature of the decision. 
However, his message to the corrupt is unequivocal: “Let's purge the corrupt out of 
our institutions and clean them up”. This “defending the reforms” frame is also 
openly promoted on al-Taghyir. On the privately owned channels al-Sumeria and 
al-Sharkiya it appears in a secondary rank. 
 
On the very periphery of the news coverage of private channel al-Sharkiya and 
AAH-owned al-Ahed a strongly critical “rejection of the reform” frame was identi-
fied in which the integrity and necessity of the reform process altogether is ques-
tioned. On al-Sharkiya, Iyad Allawi, chairman of the Iraqi National Coalition and 
former interim PM, dubs the reform process as pure austerity package asking the 
parliament to intervene. Meanwhile, al-Ahed laments the political system repeat-
edly referring to it as the “cancer of power-sharing”. 
The two Kurdish channels of the sample NRT and Rudaw indicatively barely cov-
ered the reforms.  
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b. Mosul Report 
 
The week monitored witnessed the release of the much-awaited Mosul report 
which was set up to investigate the sudden fall of Mosul into the hands of IS on 
June 10, 2014. A committee headed by Sadrist MP Hakim al-Zamli, head of the 
Defense and Security Committee in parliament, listened to more than 400 testi-
monies over six months to reach a conclusion and name those culpable. The com-
mittee blamed security and political leaders, namely former Prime Minister al-
Maliki, and called on the judiciary to hold them accountable. Both the committee 
and the report were attacked for being biased and concerned with “settling scores” 
and pressure was exerted on the committee to detract names.  
 
The most dominant frame in the news coverage monitored focused on defending, 
justifying and explaining the work of the committee as well as its methodology and 
approach. The main message of that “defending the committee” frame was that the 
work of the committee is unbiased and not based on any agenda. Here the commit-
tee is presented as a hard working team that seeks to reveal the truth. The main 
protagonist of that frame was the head of the inquiry, Hakim al-Zamli, in addition 
to other members of the investigative committee itself. Al-Zamli accuses the of-
fenders and their allies of exerting pressure on the members of the committee. 
Another protagonist in supporting the committee is parliament speaker Salim al-
Jbouri, who repeatedly reiterates that the fall of Mosul on June 10, 2014 to IS was 
the fault of security leaders and political figures, namely al-Maliki, who should be 
held accountable. This frame, supporting the committee and the result of its work, 
is clearly promoted by the state-owned al-Iraqiya but also dominant on the pri-
vately owned al-Sharkiya. On the private, commercial channel al-Sumeria as well 
as on al-Taghyir, which is funded by prominent Sunni millionaire Khamis al-
Khanji, who calls himself a “leading advocate for Iraq’s Sunni population”, this 
frame is included but only tangentially.15 
 
As mentioned above, the supporting coverage is encountered by a critical frame 
accusing the committee of being biased and unfair. According to this camp, the 
committee is a co-opted body abusing its mandate for political gains and the report 
is non-binding. The “rejecting the report” frame is brought forward by representa-
tives of the State of Law Coalition (MP Awatif Naama) as well as by former Prime 
Minister al-Maliki who was identified as the main defendant in the report. It is the 
dominant frame in the news coverage of the AAH-owned channel al-Ahed, which 
hosted a number of experts who poured criticism on the report including Tariq 
Harb, a legal expert who censures parliament for conducting the inquiry rather 
than the judiciary, arguing that “parliament is not a police station” and that Iraq 
remains “far from the culture of separation of power”. An al-Ahed reporter also 
lamented the fact that the committee allegedly overlooked the role of Kurdistan’s 
president Masoud Barzani “despite existing evidence and documents supporting 
                                                 
15 See background information on the founder of the Office of the Arab-Sunni representative for 
Iraq OASRI (http://www.oasri.org/about-us). 
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his role in the conspiracy that led to Mosul's fall”.  
 
The “rejecting the report” frame was also broadly presented by various actors on 
al-Taghyir and al-Sumeria. Maliki’s statement made to an Iranian channel where 
he dubbed the report worthless and a “conspiracy created in Ankara and then 
transferred to Erbil” is cited on the two channels. Al-Sumeria also focused on pro-
cedural violations, which they lamented as a victim of Iraq’s quota system and po-
litical consensus, ending their report cynically with “all the citizens could do was 
watch and applause”. Meanwhile, al-Taghyir did not attempt to hide their view 
that Maliki is culpable for the Mosul “catastrophe” and that the report did not fit 
the tragedy of losing Mosul to the IS.  
 
Meanwhile, the two Kurdish channels NRT and Rudaw barely covered the release 
of the Mosul Report, thereby pointing to a separation even on the airwaves of the 
Northern Iraqi region. There is just one news item during that week on both 
Rudaw and NRT covering the release of the report. Rudaw cites a Kurdish mem-
ber of the committee who congratulates the “people of Kurdistan” alongside the 
Iraqi people on the release of the report and promises them that the deaths of 
Yazidi, Christian, Kurd and “valiant Peshmerga” martyrs will not be in vain. NRT 
meanwhile cites al-Zamli and reports that Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish officials have 
finally been named responsible for the fall of Mosul. This “supporting the report” 
frame was also identified in the periphery of al-Sumeria’s coverage.  
 
c. The armed battle with IS 
 
The third theme covered during the week is the armed battle against IS. The domi-
nant frame across all channels monitored is the “military success of the Iraqi forc-
es” against the IS terrorists.  
All media outlets monitored rally around the flag and offer a generally patriotic 
coverage of the armed conflict. Indeed, all channels indiscriminately highlight the 
military successes against the “IS terrorists” while any progress by IS is mostly 
blanked out in the coverage on armed battle. Private channel al-Sumeria also 
demonstrates unconditional patriotism with their reporters exclusively covering 
“victories”, “achievements” and the “great efforts” made by security forces to de-
stroy the IS “dens”. Al-Sumeria's patriotic credo is further underlined by the slo-
gan plastered on their screen, “unified Iraq against terrorism”, and a “human in-
terest” story highlighting a Christian fighter who joined the police the day Mosul 
fell and who is happily “sacrificing” for his countrymen and is loved by his col-
leagues, who themselves hail from different religions and ethnicities.  
The framing, however, varies from the determined patriotism on al-Sumeria and 
state-owned al-Iraqiya to the more realistic coverage of private channel al-
Sharqiya, which even covers some criticism of the security forces. Al-Iraqiya high-
lights the victories of the “brave Iraqi forces” and disregards setbacks faced by the 
armed forces in their efforts to “cleanse” areas of the “fleeing terrorists”. Com-
manders of the Iraqi armed forces interviewed by the state television channel even 
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give the impression that the city of Fallujah would be freed in a matter of days, 
when in fact it took almost another year. Al-Sharqiya, on the other hand, cites the 
Vice Chairman of Anbar Provincial Council who calls on security forces to move 
the confrontation with IS away from the residential eastern areas of Ramadi.  
 
The “unity of the joint forces” frame, namely security forces, the councils, the po-
lice, commanders of different brigades, PMU militias, Christian fighters and the 
Zeravani or the Kurdish police forces is also another dominant frame common 
across the spectrum of TV channels, even in Khamis al-Khanjar’s al-Taghyir which 
has clear reservations regarding the PMU and even seems to equate them with IS. 
The channel, for instance, runs an ad during the newscast of a rotating coin with IS 
on the one side and “Iraqi militias” on the other followed by a statement reading 
that IS and the militias are two sides of the same coin. In that same vein, al-
Taghyir is the only channel that talks about difficulties faced by the national forces 
in their fight against IS and that reports on dozens of soldiers killed and injured. It 
also has a different assessment of the battles of Baiji where “IS fought strongly”. 
Hence, with a “joint forces face difficulties” frame, al-Taghyir slightly deviates 
from the otherwise ubiquitous “success of Iraqi forces”-frame, that offers no space 
for the mentioning of victims and struggle on the side of the joint forces.  
 
The key speakers in all the stations are security and military officials ranging from 
the Ministry of Defense to security forces representatives and media units of the 
armed forces. Representatives of PMU including commanders, media units and 
leaders as well as members of Anbar provincial council and tribes are also cited. 
Needless to say, no IS representative or IS statement is ever cited on any of the 
channels; state-owned al-Iraqiya even accentuates the number of IS members 
killed and areas “cleansed”. 
Despite minor variations, on IS at least, we can conclude that there is more or less 
a consensus on supporting the national security forces and non-state militias in 
their battle against IS. Nevertheless, the channels differ in how they attribute mili-
tary progress against IS. Al-Taghyir highlights the importance of air strikes carried 
out by the international forces, while al-Ahed, which runs an ad calling for finan-
cially supporting the resistance in its fight against IS, focuses on the progress made 
by the PMU. State owned al-Iraqiya, meanwhile, as stated above and as is ex-
pected, focuses on the Iraqi army’s victories.  
 
Unlike the other themes that the Kurdish channels barely report on, Kurdish 
channels Rudaw and NRT offer considerably more coverage on the battle with IS. 
NRT covers the advances made by the Iraqi army forces and the PMU in western 
Ramadi while the coverage of the battles on subsequent days is mainly about the 
Kurdistan related battles and topics. Here, successes of the Peshmerga are high-
lighted alongside the aerial bombardment carried out by the international coali-
tion. Perhaps what is most striking in the coverage of NRT is that they refer to IS 
fighters as ‘militants’ rather than ‘terrorists’.  
Apart from the advances of the Iraqi forces into Ramadi, Rudaw barley covers the 
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battles waged by the Iraqi army and the PMU. Instead, the Peshmerga battles are 
given much more attention. Rudaw repeatedly cites exclusive sources and infor-
mation which point to the beat systems between them and the Peshmerga. They 
condemn the practice of training children by IS and the PMU but fail to criticize 
teenage Peshmerga fighters interviewed in another item. Furthermore, this patri-
otic Kurdish channel also refers to Qamishly and Hasaka – cities located in East-
ern Syria – as “West Kurdistan”.  
 
 
Conclusion: pluralism on everything except IS 
 
There is consensus among observers that the media in Iraq are biased and partial 
and the findings of this study confirm this notion. The Iraqi TV channels covered 
in the study reflect the ethno-sectarian and political diversity extant in Iraq. How-
ever, despite the close link between political actors and the media, the findings re-
veal that the Arab channels monitored juxtapose a variety of frames in their cover-
age of the divisive issues of the Mosul report and the reform process. Naturally, 
each channel favors frames in accordance with their political agendas. But, with 
the exception of the state-owned al-Iraqiya, most channels monitored strove to 
include a fairly broad bandwidth of different frames in their news coverage, there-
by providing audiences with diverse viewpoints on these issues. Partisanship in the 
news coverage of Iraqi media therefore does not mean the exclusion of voices that 
oppose the general agenda of the channel. This is particularly true for the private 
channels al-Sharkiya and al-Sumeria, which both exert an obvious effort to bal-
ance existing frames. Political inclinations remain obvious among all channels 
monitored, and the AAH-owned al-Ahed stands out in this regard, but the cover-
age overall does not dogmatically and exclusively stick to one frame only. One can 
conclude therefore that media users who tend to follow news of only one channel 
will be exposed to actors and opinions of the opposing camps as well.16 The precar-
ious echo-chamber effect, therefore, is effectively mitigated by this relative internal 
pluralism.  
 
Generally, however, the media system is characterized by external pluralism where 
each camp has a reasonable share in the public sphere and where political dis-
course, as expected, is pluralistic. In the debate surrounding the reform package, 
all stakeholders were included in the coverage: the government, the protesters, ex-
perts and critics as well as religious authorities. Likewise, in the debate on the Mo-
sul report, all opinions were represented: defenders of the committee and the pub-
lication of the report, representatives of the committee, critics of the process and 
its outcome, suspects and people concerned about the consequences of the re-
port.17 Against this backdrop, the Iraqi public sphere appears to be more of an in-
                                                 
16 This statement is not valid for media users that watch the state-owned al-Iraqiya only. 
17 It is noteworthy that those directly affected by the reforms had very little opportunity to take a 
stand on the matter. Only the privately-owned channel al-Sumeria dedicated a long news item to 
staff members of the abolished Ministry of Human Rights. “The corrupt elements” targeted by the 
reforms are also not given a voice.  
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tegrative force than a source of division and exclusion. However, it should be noted 
that this study has also revealed a deep rift between Kurdish and Arab channels 
regarding the selection of topics. While the reform process and the release of the 
Report on Mosul dominated the news bulletins in all Arab channels, these issues 
were barely mentioned on the Kurdish channels monitored.  
 
On a different front, the manner in which the battle with IS was covered differs 
considerably from the coverage surrounding the fall of Mosul and the reforms. In-
deed, it appears that even in an ostensibly fragmented nation as Iraq, the media 
adopted a patriotic unifying frame on the fight against IS and the military conflict 
in al-Anbar and Salahuddin in particular. The legitimacy and efficacy of the fight 
against IS itself is uncontested. In their news coverage, all channels agree on the 
same external/internal enemy and hence on the same conflict pattern: the Iraqi 
people/the Iraqi state against the terrorists. The key message of that frame is that 
the PMU and Iraqi army are stronger than IS and that victory is imminent. The 
second key message is that IS is by and large “an evil force” that needs to be elimi-
nated. The frames identified differed only by way of crediting victories against IS to 
different groups of fighters – the Iraqi army, the PMU fighters, the Peshmerga and 
the international coalition. Depending on the outlet’s agenda, the troops of choice 
are accentuated. Pluralism of opinions is here replaced by a pluralism of nuances 
in the same narrative of the same story. Only al-Taghyir deviates from the other-
wise ubiquitous “success of Iraqi forces” frame by mentioning losses and difficul-
ties faced by the joint forces.  
While the conformity of news coverage might raise optimism regarding the unity of 
the nation against an external enemy, the limited space given to voices wary of the 
non-state militias reveals a lack of control over these groups on the battlefield and 
beyond. Human rights violations committed by the PMU during the liberation of 
Tikrit and other cities in the north of the country have gone almost unnoticed in 
the local media.18 Given the military strengths and political power of the PMU and 
its more than 100,000 fighters, this status of sanctity must be considered a threat 
to state stability and the rule of law (see also Wyer 2012; TRAC 2015; Steinberg 
2016).  
 
Another significant finding is the absence of hate speech or racism. Still, strident 
statements such as those made by former PM al-Maliki referring to the head of the 
Mosul inquiry, al-Zamli, as a murderer or dubbing the fall of Mosul a conspiracy 
spun by Turkey in collaboration with Erbil are broadcast. Drawing on Hafez’s dis-
cussion on legitimacy (2014), this denial of al-Zamli’s legitimacy to lead an inquiry 
may be perceived as a dysfunctional and a radically polarizing mode of communi-
cation. However, in all instances, al-Maliki’s statements were contextualized and 
combined with opposing statements and additional information including a state-
ment from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, these strident re-
                                                 
18 Human Rights Watch (2015). Ruinous Aftermath. Militias Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of 
Tikrit. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/20/ruinous-aftermath/militias-abuses-
following-iraqs-recapture-tikrit 
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marks cannot be deemed as inciting to violence or hatred.19 
 
Iraq is a beleaguered and fragile state. As in other fragile states, the media land-
scape is fractured alongside conflict lines and the majority of media channels have 
strong ties to political parties or movements. But contrary to allegations accusing 
the Iraqi media of fueling division, our study has shown that media largely refrain 
from attacking or delegitimizing “the other” and that considerable pluralism both 
on the level of the media system and within the most popular and mainstream me-
dia outlets exists. However, as shown above, this pluralism is limited to political 
topics rather than in the coverage of the armed battle with IS. It is our hope that 
these observations could serve as a starting point to reassess existing theories 
about the impact of Iraqi media on conflict propagation.  
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